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A REMEDY FOR A RIGHT-Unified School District

No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977)
INTRODUCTION

Judicial expansion of both the procedural and substantive
due process protection afforded teachers' in the nineteen seventies has been paralleled by a growing recognition that these protections are pre-empted by the protection the eleventh amendment offers local school districts. While in earlier decisions, the
eleventh amendment' was consistently used to avoid the imposition of damages against a school district, in Unified School District No. 480 v. Epperson3 the Tenth Circuit, for the first time,
concluded that local school districts are not immune from responding in damages if a teacher's employment contract is terminated in violation of that teacher's fourteenth amendment right
to a hearing.' Thus, by its finding in Epperson that School District No. 480 was not an alter-ego of the state and, hence, not
immune under the eleventh amendment,' the Tenth Circuit offered a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights, and provided a framework for the future analysis of the eleventh amendment's applicability to school districts.
I. THE DECISION
Oleta Peters and Lila Epperson had been teaching in Seward
County, Kansas, for eleven and seventeen years, respectively,
when they were notified in February of 1972 that their teaching
contracts would not be renewed for the upcoming school year.
See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
2 See Comment, The Dwindling Rights of Teachers and the Closing of the Courthouse
Door, 44 FoaRDiw L. REv. 511, 544 (1975). The eleventh amendment provides: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
in equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
For a recent discussion by the Supreme Court of the policy behind eleventh amendment
immunity, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 256. Under KAN, STAT. § 72-5411 (1972), both teachers had one-year teaching
contracts which were automatically renewed for the following school year unless notice of
termination is given to the teacher by March 15. The appellate opinion indicates that
other teachers, as well as the plaintiffs, had their employment terminated. Id.
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According to the school district, the contracts were not renewed
because of budgetary cuts necessitated by a declining student
population coupled with a concomitant reduction in state funds
available for local education.7 The plaintiffs, however, had a different viewpoint regarding the reason behind the termination of
their contracts: Peters was president and Epperson was
president-elect of the local branch of the National Education
Association (NEA) which had recently engaged in negotiations
with District 480's school board.' The two plaintiffs believed that
their termination was retaliatory and in violation of their first
amendment rights.9 They retained counsel and requested a hearing by the school board. Their request was denied because, in the
board's opinion, a hearing was not required when a teacher is
fired solely for budgetary reasons. 0
Plaintiffs each instituted proceedings against the District's
480 school board members, in both their individual and official
capacities, in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas." Their complaint alleged that (1) Each educator had
been denied both procedural and substantive due process under
the fourteenth amendment because she was not given a hearing
prior to the decision not to renew her contract; and (2) each had
been penalized by the school district for exercising her first12
amendment right to free speech by virtue of her NEA activities.
The parties stipulated that the first amendment claim would be
tried to a jury first, and that, subsequently, the other issues would
be tried to the court alone on the basis of the record made in the
3
trial of the first amendment claim.

551 F.2d at 256.
Id. The court explained that the negotiations between the National Education
Association and the school board had been "rather heated." Id. No explanation is given,
however, regarding the content of the negotiation sessions.

Id.
Id. The events of the case, the court notes, transpired prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Kansas law now requires that
school districts give all teachers with two years consecutive employment notice and a
hearing prior to termination. KAN. STAT. §§ 72-5436-5446 (Supp. 1976).
1 Id. The school board had previously brought a declaratory judgment action in a
Kansas state court to determine if the board had to afford the two teachers a hearing under
the terms of the teachers' contracts and state law. The plaintiffs in Epperson had the
"

declaratory judgment action removed to the district court and the actions were consolidated at trial. Id. Jurisdiction in Epperson was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (Supp.
IV, 1977), and 1343 (1976).
2 551 F.2d at 256.
" Id. at 256-57.
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The jury found for the school board on the first amendment
issue, i.e., that the plaintiffs were discharged only for budgetary
reasons. At the second preceeding, the trial court found that the
plaintiffs "had a sufficient property interest to entitle them to a
hearing before any final determination was made not to renew
their teaching contracts."" Judgment was entered, however, in
favor of the members of the school board in their individual capacities on the basis of a qualified privilege.'" The trial court also
entered judgment in favor of the school board members in their
official capacities by reasoning that the eleventh amendment
barred the entry of a monetary judgment against the school district and because reinstatement was "inappropriate," since the
jury concluded that the termination of the teachers stemmed
from budgetary considerations."6
Plaintiffs based their appeal to the Tenth Circuit solely on
the remedial question. Both teachers argued that the trial court
erred in holding that the eleventh amendment barred the entry
of a monetary judgment and that reinstatement was inappropriate."
If.

TENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH TO REMEDIAL ISSUES

The Tenth Circuit on appeal held that, despite the eleventh
amendment, the plaintiffs were entitled to monetary damages for
the wrongful denial of their procedural due process rights but
were not entitled to reinstatement.' The court's treatment of the
effect of the eleventh amendment on the defendants' liability for
monetary damages represents a significant departure from earlier
decisions which consistently protected school boards from responding in damages in spite of their disregard of employees'
constitutional perogatives." The case further provides a frame,IId.

at 257.
Citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522
F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975). The Wood court explained that school board members are
immune from damages for actions which are violative of constitutional rights if the member is acting "in good faith in the course of exercising his discretion within the scope of
his official duties." 420 U.S. at 319. See also Comment, Teacher's Speech and First
Amendment Rights - Bertot v. School District No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, Tenth Circuit
Survey, 53 DEN. L. J. 95, 100 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Teacher's Rights].
" 551 F.2d at 257. The trial took place three years after the teachers' contracts were
terminated. Id.
1IId.
, Id. at 257-60.
"Id. at 258. The court found that reinstatement was "inappropriate" because the
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work for analyzing the remedies available to educators discharged
in violation of their constitutional rights.
A. Previous Tenth Circuit Decisions Regarding the Eleventh
Amendment and School Board Immunity
The eleventh amendment2° generally has been construed as
protecting a nonconsenting state from suits brought in her own
courts by a citizen of a foreign state,"' and from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens and citizens of another state.2
The amendment's protection extends to members of a state board
or an agency acting in their official capacities.23 Political subdivisions of the state, in general, enjoy the same immunity as the
state itself if the ultimate award is derived from state revenues.2
Until Epperson, the major Tenth Circuit decision permitting
school boards to escape liability for monetary damages on the
basis of eleventh amendment considerations was Harrisv. Tooele
County School District.2 51 Harris, a diversity action against a
school board for personal injuries, was dismissed on eleventh
amendment grounds.26 To determine the applicability to the
school board of the state's eleventh amendment immunity, the
Tenth Circuit isolated the following factors: State supreme court
decisions had held that school districts are instrumentalities of
the state;27 educational costs were divided between the state and
jury found the two contracts were not renewed because of budgetary considerations. The
court said:
To grant Peters and Epperson all that they now seek, namely reinstatement,
lost pay, and consequential damages, would afford them all the relief they
could have obtained had they prevailed in the First Amendment claim,
which they did not, and would in practical effect render the three-week trial
a nullity. Such would be utterly unrealistic.
Id. at 257. See Hostrep v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.
1975); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973); Horton v. Orange County Bd.
of Educ., 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972); in all of these cases, reinstatement of the teacher
was denied on facts similar to those in Epperson.
See note 2 supra.
" Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-63 (1974).
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1945).
' Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974). Other criteria in addition to the
payment of the judgment have been used by lower federal courts. See text accompanying
note 41 infra.
- 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 219.
v Id. at 220 citing Campbell v. Board of Educ., 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 (1964);

1978

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-EPPERSON

school districts;18 and Tooele County property taxes, supplemented by state funds, would be used to pay the judgment.' The
court said that because there was a "possibility" that the judgment would be paid out of state funds, the eleventh amendment
30
barred any recovery by plaintiff.
In Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1,31 another action against the
local school district for violation of a teacher's first amendment
and procedural due process rights,32 the Tenth Circuit remanded
the damage issue to the trial court. On rehearing of the school
district's eleventh amendment defense, the trial court was instructed by the appellate court to look at Wyoming law regarding
school boards, "local circumstances," and federal law in making
its determination regarding the school board's liability for mone33
tary damages.
Two analagous cases involving state boards of regents also
indicate various factors used by the Tenth Circuit's eleventh
amendment analysis vis a vis protection for educational administrations. State control was the focus of the Tenth Circuit's analysis of whether a state board of regents was immune from liability
as an arm of the state in Brennan v. University of Kansas.3 In
Brennan the court concluded that the state's eleventh amendment protection extended to the board of regents because the
local courts had treated the board as an extension of the state,3
and because the state had centralized control over the regents'
activities. 3 Financial questions, i.e., who was to pay the judgment, were not considered by the court.
Hamilton Manufacturing Co. v. The Trustees of the State
Colleges in Colorado37 involved a suit against the trustees for
Brigham v. Board of Educ., 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950); Woodcock v. Board of
Educ., 55 Utah 458, 187 P. 181 (1920).
0 471 F.2d at 220.
n Id.
3oId.

31 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1185. See Teacher's Rights, supra note 15, at 102-05.
522 F.2d at 1185. No explanation was given by the court of the phrase "local
circumstances." Id.
451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1290, citing Murray v. State Bd. of Regents, 194 Kan. 686, 401 P.2d 898 (1965)
and Board of Regents v. Hamilton, 28 Kan. 376 (1882).
" 451 F.2d at 1290.
- 356 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1966).
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nonpayment for goods delivered to a state college." The court
held that the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment because
the State of Colorado was the real party in interest." The court
isolated the following factors in reaching its decision: whether the
state would pay the judgment; extent of state control over the
trustees; nature of the trustees' functions; whether the trustees
were a corporate body; whether the trustees could sue or be sued
in their own names; whether the trustees have the power to contract, and whether the trustees serve at the pleasure of the state
legislature. 0
Thus, in determining whether a school board is protected by
the eleventh amendment, the Tenth Circuit has not fastened
upon any one set of criteria for determining whether or not a
school board, and analogously, a board of regents, is the state's
alter ego. In Harris,the court emphasized the possibility that the
judgment might be paid from state coffers; in Brennan, control,
not finances, was the key factor; in Bertot, the court alluded
vaguely to local circumstances and laws; and in Hamilton, the
court identified a cluster of criteria." While the question of state
control and the ability of the local board to pay the judgment are
always prime factors in the court's analysis, other factors have
been used by the court, seemingly at random. Moreover, of the
two main factors, i.e., control and ability to pay the judgment,
one may be given greater weight than the other, again seemingly
at random. Brennan, for example, focused on control, but in
Hamilton, control was only one of many criteria reviewed by the
court.
In Harris,the case which most clearly articulated the court's
position on the financial question, the court used a standard
uId. at 600.
" Id. at 601.
40Id.

Other jurisdictions have isolated various factors in determining whether or not a
school board is the state's alter ego. For example, in Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School
Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit said that the important considerations in the decision are: whether the local district could pay the judgment; whether the
entity performs "essential government functions"; the district's ability to sue or be sued;
its power to own property in its own name; and the school district's corporate status. Id.
at 966. See Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975); George R.
Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1974); Morris v. Board
of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188 (D. Del. 1975); Smith v. Concordia Parish School Bd., 387 F.
Supp. 887 (W. D. La. 1975).
"1
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which is strongly supportive of the school board's eleventh
amendment defense: Even if there is only a possibility that the
state will have to pay part of the judgment, that judgment will
be barred. 2 The dissenting opinion in Harris pointed out that
state funds do not actually have to be used to pay the judgment;
local funds could pay for the judgment since the school district
can levy a tax on local residents to meet the costs of the judgment.4 3 But it is the possibility, not the actuality, which controls.
B. Epperson and the Eleventh Amendment Connection
As the Tenth Circuit noted," the court had the benefit of a
recent United States Supreme Court decision on school districts'
eleventh amendment immunity when deciding Epperson. Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle" dealt
squarely with the question of whether a school district is an arm
of the state and thus able to draw upon eleventh amendment
protections." The Supreme Court concluded that the school
board was not an alter ego of the state, based on three factors:
Local law treatment of school districts as distinct political entities from the state; the amount of control exerted by the state
over the school board; and the power of the school district to raise
money. 7 Taking these factors as a totality, the Supreme Court
concluded that the local school district in question was "more like
a county or city than . . . like an arm of the State.""
The Tenth Circuit drew upon the Mt. Healthy analysis in
Epperson, utilizing the three factors isolated by the Supreme
Court: Local law, control, and finances. The court found that
under Kansas statutes a school district can sue and be sued in its
own name, execute contracts, own real and personal property,
See Note, The Educational System and the Eleventh Amendment-Prohibitionof
Suits Against States: Can Teachers Protect Their Constitutional Rights? 16 WASHBURN
L. J. 102, 110 n.83 (1976).
" Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 222 (1973)(Holloway, J., dissenting). UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-27 (1977) gives a school district the power to levy
property taxes to pay a judgment.
4 551 F.2d at 259.
- 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
' Id. at 280. Mt. Healthy involved the issue of whether a teacher's first and fourteenth amendment rights had been violated by the school district's refusal to renew his
teaching contract. Id. at 276.
," Id. at 280.
9lId.
42
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and function as a corporate entity."9 School districts in Kansas
receive "substantial state aid" for local educational needs, but
also have the power to levy taxes within the school district area
to fund the local budget.50 As to control, the court found that the
Kansas State Board of Education exercised a broad supervisory
power over the local school districts which did not amount to
"control."'5 The court concluded that, like the Ohio school district in the Mt. Healthy case, School District No. 480 was more
akin to a municipality, rather than an alter ego of the state, and
thus was deprived of eleventh amendment immunity.2
The court then distinguished two of its earlier decisions
which had extended eleventh amendment protection to a school
district and to boards of regents. The court said that Brennan v.
University of Kansas," the board of regents case, was factually
quite different from Epperson. The Board had no taxing authority and the Board "really runs" the state university, thus exercising actual control, not mere supervision." The school district
case, Harrisv. Tooele County School District,55 was distinguished
on the grounds "that [in Harris] a money judgment rendered in
federal court against the school district might be paid, at least
partially, out of state funds."" The judgment against School District No. 480, on the other hand, would be raised by special levy
within the district and would not come from state funds.5
The distinction the court drew between Harrisand Epperson
is practically nonexistent. Both school districts had the power to
o 551 F.2d at 260. See KA. STAT. § 72-8201 (1972).
" 551 F.2d at 260. See KAN. STAT. §§ 72-8204(a), 8209, 7021 (1972). KA. STAT. §§
72-8801 to 8812 (Supp. 1976) regulate the amount of taxes which can be raised by a local
school district and sets up notice to citizens and election requirements in the event the
tax is opposed by ten per cent of the qualified electors.
11 551 F.2d at 260. In the case of State ex tel. Miller v. Board of Educ. of Unified
School Dist. No. 398, 212 Kan. 482, 511 P.2d 705 (1973), the Kansas Supreme Court, in
upholding a regulation issued by the State Board of Education, said, "Considering the
frame of reference in which the term [supervision] appears both in the constitution and
the statutes, we believe 'supervision' means something more than to advise but something
less than to control." Id. at 492, 511 P.2d at 713.
0 551 F.2d at 260.
3 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
',551 F.2d at 260.
" 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
" 551 F.2d at 260.
Id. See text accompanying note 50 supra. Under KA. STAT. § 72-8209 (1972) the
I7
district has the power to levy a tax solely for the purpose of paying a judgment.
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levy taxes within the local area to fund the school budget, and to
pay judgments, and both school districts received substantial
state subsidies for educational purposes.58 The Harris court
seemed to imply that if local educational funds were used to pay
the judgment then state funds would have to be increased proportionately to take up the slack.59 The Epperson court said that
since the Kansas school district had the power to levy a tax solely
for the purpose of paying the judgment, 0 without resorting to any
general educational fund, there is no direct or indirect pipeline
to the state coffers and no eleventh amendment immunity. But
since the governing statutes in each respective state are virtually
identical, this distinction drawn by the Tenth Circuit is without
merit.
III.

SCHOOL DISTRICT IMMUNITY IN FUTURE DECISIONS

The Epperson decision, following the Supreme Court's lead
in Mt. Healthy,6 isolated three factors to be used in determining
whether a local school district is an arm of the state for eleventh
amendment protection purposes: Local law, control, and finances. 2 By isolating these factors, the decision focused on the
critical elements which must be established by a plaintiff seeking
redress of his constitutional rights to avoid the defense of eleventh
amendment immunity. Other factors considered by the Tenth
Circuit and other federal courts in previous decisions 3 are now
extraneous. By narrowing down the critical elements of proof in
school district-eleventh amendment cases, counsel should be
able to assess a client's case against a school district more readily, since there are fewer factors with which to contend. This
consideration is important from a practical standpoint because if
eleventh amendment immunity is ultimately granted to the
school district, the teacher's suit to vindicate his constitutional
rights is a hero's cause, with an empty promise of monetary recovery.
The financial ability of a school district to pay a judgment
without direct or indirect state aid remains the one factor which
' Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254, 260 (1976); Harris v. Tooele
County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 220, 222 (10th Cir. 1973). (Holloway, J., dissenting).
' 471 F.2d at 220.
See note 57 supra.
' 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
6 See text accompanying notes 25-43 and note 41 supra.
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the Tenth Circuit apparently finds crucial (in an albeit hazy
manner) when extending eleventh amendment protection. If
there is a possibility that the judgment will be satisfied from the
state treasury, then the eleventh amendment is applicable."' On
the other hand, if there is no chance the money will come from
the state, then there are no eleventh amendment protections."e
The Tenth Circuit, however, may be relaxing the stringent standard set in Harris concerning the meaning of "possibility." In
Harris the local school district's power to levy taxes to pay for a
judgment was not enough to cut off the possibility of the utilization of state funds to pay the judgment; in Epperson the local
levying power, although nearly identical to that in Harris, was
enough to preclude the possible use of state funds and thus, eleventh amendment protections. 6 By distinguishing cases that are
nondistinguishable, the court may be indicating a greater willingness to find that a school district is not an alter ego of the state,
by not requiring the plaintiff to show there is no possibility of
state fund utilization. Under Harris this showing apparently
amounted to proving complete state abandonment of local education.
CONCLUSION

The Epperson decision makes practical suits against school
districts for violation of their employees' constitutional rights, by
providing for a damage award when it can be shown that a school
district is not an alter ego of the state. By isolating the criteria
to be used in determining whether a school district is an alter ego,
the court has clarified both the critical relationship that must be
established between the state and the school district and the
court's less protective inclinations toward school districts.
Moreover, by upholding a damage award against a school
district, the court has provided an incentive to prevent future
violations of teachers' constitutional rights. Without the prospect
of a damage award, a school district has little to lose by failing
to comply with due process requirements. 7 Teachers have not, by
virtue of their employment, consented to the denial of the same
" See text accompanying note 59 supra.

* See text accompanying note 60 supra.
"

See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 692 (1974)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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basic rights and remedies enjoyed by other citizens, 8 and
Epperson provides a vital remedy for a constitutional right.
Mary L. Groves
U

Comment, The Dwindling Rights of Teachers and the Closing CourthouseDoor, 44

FoRDHim L. REv. 511, 544 (1975).

